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Empirical evidence shows that the perception of information is strongly concentrated in those 
environments in which a mass of producers and users of knowledge interact through a 
distribution medium. This paper considers the consequences of this fact for economic 
equilibrium analysis. In particular, it examines how the ranking schemes applied by the 
distribution technology affect the use of knowledge, and it then describes the characteristics 
of an optimal ranking scheme. The analysis is carried out using a model in which agents’ 
productivity is based on the stock of knowledge used. The value of a piece of information is 
assessed in terms of its contribution to productivity. 
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1 Introduction
It has often been observed that one of the handicaps of economics in comparison
to science is the lack of empirical laws, that is, robust regularities that restrict
the possible outcomes of interactions between individuals. Now it seems that com-
puter science can provide us with such regularities in the form of “the laws of the
web”(Huberman [2001]). These newly discovered laws tell us the following: (i) No
matter how huge the supply of diﬀerent pieces of information, user perception is
still concentrated on only a relatively small number of documents and sites. (ii)
The selection of the set of items on which user attention is focused is signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by the ranking algorithms used by search engines (e.g., PageRank).1 Ob-
viously, these laws are not conﬁned to World Wide Web communication. They can
also be observed in other environments in which a rich supply of information is
distributed to a broad range of users. For instance, the distribution of knowledge
through journals in international scientiﬁc communities displays similar regularities.
Citations are heavily concentrated, reader attention focuses on highly ranked jour-
nals, and standardized ranking procedures are used to assign priorities.2 The aim
of this paper is to show (i) the consequences of this limitation of perception for
economic equilibrium analysis, and (ii) how the design of the distribution system
aﬀects application of knowledge and economic performance in an economy in which
1See Huberman [2001] for a broad overview and potential explanations of power laws in the
Internet. Lempel and Moran [2003] summarize evidence about the inﬂuence of the order of pre-
sentation of information on browsing patterns. Cho and Roy [2004] provide an empirical analysis
of the impact of search engines on page popularity.
2See Klamer and van Dalen [2002] for evidence.3
the productivity of agents is based on the stock of knowledge used.
The model presented in this paper accounts for the observed empirical regularities
in the following stylized way. A research sector supplies knowledge in the form of
documents published in diﬀerent information sources. The documents are brought
to user attention by means of a distribution system. The probability that a docu-
ment from a given information source is shown depends on the design of this system.
Documents from the same source are treated identically. Users can process a lim-
ited number of documents. They allocate this capacity to the diﬀerent sources in
accordance with the visibility of documents implied by the distribution system. The
distribution and perception of knowledge feeds back into the supply of knowledge
by the research sector: Only those sources of information that attract suﬃcient user
attention survive. The supply and distribution of knowledge is complemented by an
application sector in which the productivity of users depends on the set of informa-
tion sources they use. The model is static. There is no accumulation of knowledge
over time.
The fact that user perception of information is inﬂuenced by the ranking assigned to
diﬀerent sources in the distribution process naturally leads to the question as to what
is an appropriate ranking. For instance, in the context of scientiﬁc publications, we
are used to asking ourselves what is an adequate weight of core journals relative
to ﬁeld journals in scientiﬁc ratings. Likewise, the World Wide Web community
is concerned about the inﬂuence of the algorithms used by search engines and is
looking for ways to improve the ranking systems in operation. For instance, Cho et4
al. [2005] and Huberman and Wu [2006] propose mechanisms that aim at breaking
popularity traps by increasing the chance that new items have of appearing in the
top ranks.
Obviously, the fact that information use is aﬀected by the ranking of information
in the distribution system also has important economic consequences, in particular
for the question as to how to achieve an eﬃcient allocation of economic resources.
This paper accounts for the economic consequences by considering information as
a productivity-enhancing input. More speciﬁcally, I use a nested CES function for
modeling user productivity as a function of the diversity and the quality of the
information sources used. A distribution technology is optimal if it assigns ranks to
diﬀerent types of information sources in a way that leads to maximal productivity.
Information sources can diﬀer in two respects. They may be vertically diﬀerentiated
in the sense that diﬀerent sources provide documents of diﬀerent quality or diﬀerent
degree of specialization. Or they may be horizontally diﬀerentiated in the sense that
documents from diﬀerent sources belong to diﬀerent ﬁelds but are equal with respect
to quality and speciﬁcity. In order to capture these two aspects, I distinguish two
types of sources, A and B, where B sources are horizontally diﬀerentiated.
The fact that user attention is concentrated on a relatively small number of doc-
uments underpins the general point made by Herbert Simon [1971] that “in an
information-rich economy there is a poverty of attention” (p. 40). Thus, this paper
is related to the literature on limited attention (see, e.g., Kahneman [1973], Sims
[2003], Gabaix et al. [2006], Falkinger [2007a, 2007b], and the references cited in
these works). However, this literature focuses mainly on user behavior. Exceptions5
are Falkinger [2007a and 2007b], which look at competition for attention and the
equilibrium supply of information. Compared to these works, the innovative con-
tribution of this paper is an economic analysis of the role of priority settings in
the distribution of information, in particular, the impact of rankings of information
sources on the eﬀective stock of knowledge of an economy.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents details of the model.
Section 3 describes the optimal distribution system, and Section 4 discusses impli-
cations for research policy. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
In order to investigate how the distribution of information aﬀects economic per-
formance, I consider an economy consisting of three sectors. One sector produces
knowledge and supplies it in the form of documents. The next sector distributes
these documents. The third sector consists of users who apply the information
they have received and build up their stock of knowledge. This stock of knowledge
determines their productivity.
2.1 Supply of knowledge
Researchers describe their ﬁndings in documents. The documents appear in sources.
The sources are classiﬁed. To be concrete, I consider two types of sources. There
is a mass 1 of A sources. Each A source provides nA documents of quality qA. In
addition, there is a set I = [0,I], I > 0, of B sources. For simplicity’s sake, it is
assumed that B sources are identical with respect to the number and the quality6
of the documents. Each B source provides nB documents of quality qB. However,
the documents appearing in the diﬀerent sources come from diﬀerent backgrounds
(“ﬁelds”). Thus, I is a measure of the diversity of the knowledge supplied, whereas
the distinction between A and B sources accounts for other aspects of heterogene-
ity, for instance, quality diﬀerentials or general interest topics vs. specialized ﬁeld
knowledge. The analysis is consistent with the interpretation that documents from
A sources satisfy higher quality standards than documents from B sources. Alter-
natively, whatever the quality diﬀerential, we may think of A sources as outlets for
core knowledge which is of interest to all users, regardless of whatever other more
speciﬁc information is processed. Quality and number of documents provided in
the diﬀerent sources are the characteristics of the research sector. Diversity I and
visibility of A sources relative to B sources depend on the distribution technology.
2.2 Distribution of knowledge
There is a user population of mass 1 looking for information. The users have access
to a medium that shows them documents from the 1 + I sources of the research
sector. All users see the same set of documents. The ranking of the distribution
system is modeled as follows. Documents from A sources are shown to the users with
probability rA, documents from B sources with probability rB. Thus, the number
of documents that are visible to a user is given by rAnA + IrBnB ≡ τ. Each user
has the capacity to process τ documents. If τ < τ, all documents will be processed.
This would mean that we are in an information-poor economy – for instance, in a
small science community with a local distribution technology, where each member7
may be able to study any received document. Under global distribution technologies
like the World Wide Web, there is an abundance of available documents. Therefore,
τ > τ is assumed for the remainder of the analysis. Users allocate their capacity
τ according to the relative visibility of information sources. This means that the
probability that a user will process a document from a source of type i is given by
mi =
rini










where z reﬂects the relative visibility of A sources compared to a B source. Since
the size of the user population is normalized to one, mi is also the impact of a source
of level i in terms of downloads. I assume that an information source is only viable
if it reaches some minimal impact m > 0. That means that the relative visibility









(Obviously, m < τ is required, for otherwise no A source would ever attract suﬃcient
attention to survive.) The variables z and I depend on the design of the distribution
system. For given characteristics of the research sector, the relative visibility z of A
documents compared to B documents is determined by the probability diﬀerential
rA/rB. This diﬀerential is set by the algorithm that controls the presentation of
information from diﬀerent sources to users. The algorithm also controls the diversity
of sources visible to the users.
3According to (1), mA = zτ/(z + I) and mB = τ/(z + I). Thus, mA ≥ m and mB ≥ m are
equivalent to the ﬁrst and second inequalities in (2), respectively.8
2.3 Application of knowledge
Users combine the information obtained from the various documents to form their
stock of knowledge. The productivity of the user population depends on the quality
and the diversity of the documents that have been processed. Let user productivity
be denoted by Q, where Q is produced by combining the information inputs from
the 1 + I sources. In eﬃciency units, the information input from an A source is
qAmA. The input from a B source is qBmB. To model the relative importance of the




















where ϕ > 0,ϕ  = 1 and ρ > 1. Parameter ρ is equal to the elasticity of the knowledge
gained from B sources with respect to the diversity of B sources. Thus, ρ reﬂects the
value of diversity. 1/ϕ is the elasticity of substitution between information received
from A sources and information received from a B source. If ϕ is very high, then
A-level information cannot be substituted by B-level information. If ϕ approaches
zero, then A and B sources are exchangeable. Finally, bA and bB allow for diﬀerences
in the importance of information from A and B sources, respectively.
For ϕ → 1, the technology (3) corresponds to a (generalized) Cobb-Douglas function
Q = (qAmA)bADbB.4 It is worth noting that this case can also be interpreted as a
reduced form of the following two-stage process of knowledge-based production. Q
4The results derived also apply to this case.9
requires the integration of specialized ﬁeld knowledge. The B sources supply ﬁeld
knowledge in I diﬀerent ﬁelds and together provide the stock of knowledge D as
given in (4). Output Q depends both on the size of D and on the users’ ability to
exploit D. This ability depends in turn on the core knowledge provided by the A
sources. This gives
Q = qAmAD, (5)
which is an instance of the generalized Cobb-Douglas function.
3 Design of optimal information distribution










The square-bracketed term shows how visibility (z) of A documents and diversity
(I) of B documents add to productivity. The factor τ
z+I reﬂects the conﬂict between
the visibility of A-level items and the promotion of diversity.5 The variables z and I
are determined by the way in which the distribution technology presents information
sources to users. Under an optimal distribution technology, z and I maximize user
performance. Thus, we have to solve
max
z,I
Q subject to (2). (7)
5In an information-poor environment, where users are able to pay attention to any document
they receive, this factor boils down to rBnB. Since both the number of documents and their range
of diﬀusion are small, promotion of documents from diﬀerent information sources does not generate
competition for user attention.10
The following proposition characterizes the optimal program:
Proposition 1. (Optimal information distribution). Assume rBnB > m.
(i) A maximizer of (7) satisﬁes
z + I = τ/m (8)
and z ≥ 1,I ≤ τ/m − 1 ≡ I.
Optimal diversity is given by I∗ = min
 
I,I0 
, where I0 is a function of s ≡ τ/m
and q ≡ qA/qB. Optimal visibility is given by z∗ = max{1,z0},z0 ≡ τ/m − I0. I0
and z0 have the following properties:
(ii) If ρ(1 − ϕ) < 1, then
∂I
0/∂s > 0, ∂z
0/∂s > 0. (9)
(iii) If ρ(1−ϕ) ≥ 1, an optimal program with I > 0 may not exist. If it exists, then
∂I
0/∂s > 0, ∂z
0/∂s ≤ 0. (10)
∂z0/∂s = 0 applies if ρ(1 − ϕ) = 1.
(iv) Finally,
∂I0/∂q > 0, ∂z0/∂q < 0 if ϕ > 1,
∂I0/∂q < 0, ∂z0/∂q > 0 if ϕ < 1.
(11)
For ϕ = 1,I0 and z0 are independent of q.
Proof: See Appendix.
The assumption of rBnB > m requires that the distribution technology promotes
documents from B sources suﬃciently so as to be viable. This guarantees that users
are exposed to rich information under an optimal program. Information exposure11
is given by τ = rAnA + rBnBI = rBnB(z + I). In view of (8), rBnB > m implies
τ > τ. In other words, there is crowding of information and user attention focuses
on a subset of the documents that have been presented. Part (i) of the proposition
shows that under an optimal program, there is a conﬂict between visibility of A
documents and diversity. Accounting for mA ≥ m in the design of the optimal
distribution system means that A documents are considered to be essential. z ≥ 1
guarantees that A sources are viable.6 This restricts the space left for the diversity
of B sources. The feasible set is deﬁned by the ratio of the user capacity to the
minimal impact requirement. Thus, s is a measure for the size of the perception
space. The space expands if the focus of user attention (τ) is extended or if the
survival constraint (m) for information sources is reduced, that is, fewer downloads
are required to stay in business.
Part (ii) deals with the case of diversity of information sources having relatively
little importance for user productivity (i.e., ρ is low), or of A sources not being
easily substitutable by diversity of B sources (i.e., 1/ϕ is low). In particular, Part (ii)
applies if ϕ ≥ 1, which means that the elasticity of substitution between information
received from an A source and information received from a B source is equal to or
less than one. The conditions in (9) show that in the case of an interior solution,
any room for additional information sources should be used to increase both the
diversity of B sources and the visibility of A sources.
Remark: Recall that ϕ → 1 corresponds to the case of a generalized Cobb-Douglas
production function for Q. In particular, this covers the case of knowledge produc-
6According to (2), mA ≥ m is equivalent to z(τ/m − 1) ≥ I. In view of (8), this inequality
reduces to z ≥ 1.12
tion described by (5). For ϕ → 1, the optimal program can be explicitly calculated










If ρ > b( τ
m −1), then I0 > I, z0 < 1, so that the optimal program is I = τ
m −1,z = 1
rather than (12).
Part (iii) shows that the space for additional information sources should be used
diﬀerently if diversity has relatively substantial importance, or if information from A
sources is easily substitutable by information from B sources. In this case, according
to (10), any additional space should be used to increase the diversity of B sources
rather than the visibility of the documents from A sources. However, no optimal
program with a positive mass of B sources may exist in the ﬁrst place; this would
be the case, for example, if the relative importance (b) or the quality gap (q) of
information from A sources over information from B sources were high.7 Finally,
the impact of a change in the quality diﬀerential (q) of information from A sources
over information from B sources is shown by part (iv) of the proposition. Whether
or not a higher quality gap should lead to greater promotion of documents from A
sources and lower diversity of B sources depends on the elasticity of substitution
between the two inputs for user productivity.
7As shown in the proof, suﬃcient conditions for dQ/dI < 0 at any I are: ρ(1 − ϕ) > 1 and
bq1−ϕ(τ/m)ρ(1−ϕ)−1 ≥ ρ(τ/m)ϕ. The left-hand side of the inequality increases with b, but also
with q, since ρ(1 − ϕ) > 1 implies that ϕ < 1. In this case, it would be optimal to bring only A
documents to users’ attention.13
4 Discussion
In the analysis presented here, user value is generated by the interaction between the
research sector and the design of the distribution system that brings knowledge from
the research sector to the attention of the users. The research sector is characterized
by the number and quality of research documents produced, ni and qi, respectively,
i ∈ {A,B}. The essential parameter controlled by the distribution system is the
priority r ≡ rA/rB attributed to documents from A sources compared to documents
from B sources. A high priority means that documents from A sources have a
greater chance than documents from B sources of showing up in the list of items
on which user attention focuses. By controlling r, the distribution system controls
relative visibility and diversity of information sources. This interaction between
production and distribution of knowledge leads to two questions. First, what are
the implications for the research sector if the distribution of research to users is
based on priority r? Second, how should the design of the distribution system react
to given characteristics of the research sector?
4.1 How distribution design aﬀects the impact of research
The crucial variable which is aﬀected by the design of the distribution system is
impact. According to (1), the impacts of the various research sources are mA = zτ
z+I
and mB = τ
z+I. For any distribution design satisfying the restrictions z + I = τ/m





m, mB = m, (13)14
where z ≥ 1 requires rnA/nB ≥ 1.
Suppose ﬁrst that parameter r of the distribution technology is ﬁxed. Then the
impact of A sources increases if more documents are published in these sources. As
a consequence, their visibility is increased and B sources are crowded out. B sources
could counteract by increasing their number of publications. This would increase
the diversity of B sources but would not strengthen the impact of any single source.
From the point of view of an individual researcher, the equations in (13) conﬁrm
that placing documents in A sources leads to a stronger reputation if individual
reputation is measured by the impact of the publication outlet. This remains true
if individual reputation is measured by the impact of published documents, mi/ni,
as long as the distribution design gives priority to A sources (r > 1).
Things are diﬀerent if the distribution system reacts to changes in the research
sector. If parameter r of the distribution technology is optimally adjusted, then
mA = z∗τ
z∗+I∗ and mB = τ
z∗+I∗, which – in view of Part (i) of Proposition 1 – reduces
to
mA = z
∗m, mB = m. (14)
Hence, any attempt by the research sector to aﬀect the impact of research by means
of the number of published documents is oﬀset by the distribution system. The only
variable that is under the control of the research sector and may aﬀect (through
z∗) the impact of research on users is the quality of the documents published. For
instance, A sources could raise the quality gap over B sources by applying stricter
quality control in the selection of published documents. However, Part (iv) of Propo-
sition 1 shows that this does not necessarily improve the visibility of A sources.15
Whether or not stricter quality control pays oﬀ in terms of impact depends on the
substitutability between the diﬀerent types of information sources for user produc-
tivity. In the case of ϕ → 1, resulting for instance under the two-stage process of
knowledge application described by (5), the quality gap plays no role in visibility
(see Equation (11)). For the individual researcher, the conclusion that it is better
to place a document in an A source rather than in a B source remains generally
valid under an optimally designed distribution technology – if individual reputation
is measured by the impact of the publication source. This is a consequence of the
fact that A sources are considered to be essential (z ≥ 1). More precisely, there is
an incentive to publish in an A source as long as z∗ > 1. If individual reputation is
based on the impact of published documents, mi/ni, publication in an A source is
attractive if nA/nB < z∗.
A useful example for illustrating the policy implications of these results is the recent
debate among economists as to how the European science community can improve
its position relative to the United States. One central aspect concerns the “accep-
tance of publications-cum-citations in international journals as a measure of research
performance with the implication that incentives be provided on that basis to indi-
viduals and departments” (Dr` eze and Estevan [2007], p. 289). Now, one thing which
the above analysis tells us is that individuals and single departments will indeed try
harder to publish in A journals if incentives are based on impact. However, a second
conclusion is that sooner or later journal rankings may be adjusted when a large
population strengthens its eﬀorts to get distributed through an A source. Why and
how is discussed in the following subsection.16
4.2 Which sources of knowledge should be favored by the
distribution technology?
Should distribution technologies give priority to knowledge from A sources when
presenting information to their users? Parameter r expresses the weight assigned to




The optimal adjustment to variations in the number of documents published by a
source was already addressed in the previous section. Since z∗ does not depend
on the number of documents supplied by the diﬀerent sources, one deﬁnite answer
follows immediately from Equation (15). An optimal distribution design should
adjust priorities in favor of B sources if the number of A documents increases relative
to the number of B documents. This would happen, for instance, if the fact that
more people target their eﬀorts towards publishing in A sources led to relatively
more A publications than B publications in the aggregate. Obviously, this is not
the only possibility. Another consequence could be that the quality diﬀerential,
qA/qB, would change. To see the implications of such a change, we have to look at
the role of z∗.
According to Proposition 1, z∗ is a function of the quality diﬀerential q and of the size
of the perception space s deﬁned by the users’ attention capacity and the minimal
impact required for a viable source. Combining the results of Proposition 1 with
Equation (15), we see that the impact of both s and q on the optimal ranking of
sources is ambiguous. It is not true that, generally, the relative weights assigned to17
diﬀerent sources by the distribution system should reﬂect their quality diﬀerential.
In particular, in the event that productivity results from integrating knowledge from
various ﬁelds (see (5)), the presentation of information to the users should not be
biased in favor of top quality. The reason is that such a bias has costs in the form
of a less diverse set of information sources from which users draw their knowledge.
The second determinant for the optimal ranking is s, the size of the perception
space. According to Proposition 1, an increase in the users’ perception capacity, or
an environment that allows sources to survive despite their low impact, should be
used to present a larger variety of sources to the users. However, whether or not
this should be accompanied by a change in the relative ranking of sources cannot
be answered unequivocally. For ϕ → 1, the answer is that the ranking should
be invariant with respect to changes in the diversity of B sources resulting from
variations in the scale of viable information sources. In this respect, the American
Economic Association’s plan to launch new ﬁeld journals will be an interesting
experiment. Will this distract attention from other ﬁeld journals or will it lead
to an adjustment of the relative weight of general-interest journals in international
rankings?
4.3 What improves user productivity?
Under optimal distribution of information, user productivity is given by Function
(6) evaluated at the optimal distribution design z∗,I∗, where z∗ + I∗ = τ/m and
z∗ ≥ 1. Let Q∗ denote the resulting productivity. Applying the envelope theorem,18










> 0, s ≡ τ/m. (17)
If the information technology is adjusted in an optimal way, then raising the quality
of research is always good for user productivity. Moreover, and maybe less obviously,
increasing the number of publications does not help. This is an implication of the
“laws of the web”. User attention concentrates on a small subset of the available
pieces of information. Therefore, user productivity cannot be increased by supplying
more items unless the quality of information is improved. Any increase in the aggre-
gate number of supplied documents is oﬀset by a lower probability that a particular
document will be downloaded by a user. In an information-poor environment, this
would be diﬀerent. If τ < τ, any published document is used. In this case, an
increase in the number of publications would increase user productivity.
Apart from the quality of research, the size of the perception space also matters
for user productivity. For a given user capacity of perception, this size expands if
the impact requirement for information sources is relaxed. In practice, this would
mean that in the research sector, information sources with low impact are kept
alive. We know from the preceding discussion that the consequences for the optimal
distribution design are ambiguous. However, according to Proposition 1, diversity
deﬁnitely increases under the optimal distribution design. And so too does user
productivity, according to (17).19
5 Conclusion
Kant, when he asked “What can we know?”, came to the conclusion that all our
perception is framed by categories. This abstract idea has occasionally been illus-
trated in more practical terms, for example the observation that what a ﬁsherman
catches depends on the size of the mesh in his ﬁshing net. Today the net that allows
everyone in the world to visit the philosopher without going to K¨ onigsberg has its
own laws. Users see what is brought to their attention. The purpose of this paper
was to point out some important implications of this fact.
Economic productivity is a function of the stock of knowledge. Knowledge ﬂows
from a rich set of sources and is brought to the user by means of a distribution
technology based on a ranking scheme. The essential parameters in the design of this
technology are the priorities given to diﬀerent types of sources. They determine the
subset of documents on which user attention is concentrated and thus the eﬀective
knowledge base for productivity. An optimal design has to set priorities in a way that
maximizes the value of information brought to the users’ attention, where the value
of information is measured in terms of its contribution to productivity. This paper
showed how the optimal distribution design has to account for both the quality and
the diversity of information. The idea of giving maximal visibility to sources that
are accepted as essential – like core journals or top-quality web sites – is generally
not the best one. It leads to suboptimal diversity by crowding out horizontally
diﬀerentiated sources of knowledge.
The analysis presented here has the following implications for the research sector.
For a given ranking scheme used by the distribution technology, individual pub-20
lishers can strengthen their impact on users by increasing the number of published
documents, and research communities can intensify their impact by targeting their
eﬀorts at more visible outlets. As a consequence, other sources of knowledge will
have less impact on users and the mix of applied information will change. In order
to reestablish the productivity-maximizing mix, the priorities given to the diﬀerent
sources by the distribution system have to be adjusted. Under an optimal ranking
scheme, the research sector cannot inﬂuence the impact on users by changing the
number of publications. The reason is that the knowledge actually applied by the
users is only a subset of the supplied information. Which subset is used depends on
the design of the distribution technology. Finally, the mere number of documents
provided by a given type of information source is also not essential for the users’
productivity. What counts is the quality of the information and the size of the
perception space. This size is determined by the users’ capacity to process informa-
tion in interaction with the minimal impact required from an information source to
participate in knowledge production.
These conclusions are based on the assumption that information is abundant – an
assumption motivated by the “laws of the web”, which indicate that users concen-
trate on a narrow subset of items. Obviously, things are diﬀerent if the information
supply is scarce. Then users can process each piece of information that has been
produced.21
A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
The Lagrangian for max Q s.t. (2) is








m − z − I
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where Q is given by (6) and λ,µ ≥ 0. The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
Qz + λ − µ = 0 and QI −
λ
τ/m − 1




















(Subscript notation is used for partial derivatives.)
Proposition 1 is proved in three steps. First, I show that no interior maximizer
exists, i.e., z + I = τ/m or z( τ
m − 1) = I. Second, I show that (z,I) satisfying
z+I < τ/m and z(τ/m−1) = I cannot be a maximizer. These two steps prove Part
(i) of the proposition. Step 3 characterizes the maximizer subject to the restriction
z + I = τ/m.







, we obtain from (A2) and (A3) the conditions
Qz R 0 if I R zx, (A4)







Now, for µ = λ = 0, a necessary condition for a maximum is Qz = QI = 0.
According to (A4) and (A5), this cannot hold since ρ > 1. Hence, no interior22
solution exists.





= I and z + I = zτ/m = I τ
τ−m. Thus,
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Hence, QI > 0, so that I is extended as long as z + I < τ/m.
Step 3. Suppose µ > 0, i.e., z + I = τ/m. Since restriction z ≥ I
τ/m−1 must hold
as well, we have
I ≤ τ/m − 1 ≡ I and z ≥ 1. (A6)
The assumption rBnB > m implies τ = rBnB(z+I) > τ, that is, we are indeed in an
information-rich environment. We now look for a maximizer of Q under the restric-






















where q ≡ qA/qB and b ≡ bA/bB. Figures A and B show condition (A7) for the cases
1 > ρ(1 − ϕ) and 1 ≤ ρ(1 − ϕ), respectively. (They correspond to Parts (ii) and
(iii) of the proposition.) Curve L represents the left-hand side of (A7), and Curve
R shows the right-hand side. At I0, condition (A7) holds with equality.23









For 1−ρ(1−ϕ) > 0, the R curve has a positive slope, starting at zero for I = 0. If
ϕ ≥ 1, the L curve is convex. If ϕ < 1, it is concave. But in any case the L curve




is the maximizer of our problem.
An increase in s ≡ τ/m shifts the L curve outwards. Thus, ∂I0/∂s > 0. An
increase in b takes the R curve upwards so that ∂I0/∂b < 0. Furthermore, an
increase in q rotates the R curve upwards if ϕ < 1 and downwards if ϕ > 1.
Thus, ∂I0/∂q0 < 0 if ϕ < 1 and ∂I0/∂q > 0 if ϕ > 1. For the eﬀects of τ/m,b,
and q on z0, we recall z0 = τ/m − I0. Thus, sign[∂z0/∂b] = −sign[∂I0/∂b] and







Thus, sign[∂z0/∂s] = sign[∂I0/∂s],s ≡ τ/m.









Since ϕ < 1, the L curve is concave in this case, whereas the R curve is negatively
sloped and convex for 1 − ρ(1 − ϕ) < 0 and is a horizontal line if 1 = ρ(1 − ϕ).




is the maximizer of our problem. However, the R curve may be lying
to the northeast of the L curve. (For instance, if bq1−ϕ(τ/m)ρ(1−ϕ)−1 ≥ ρ(τ/m)ϕ,
then the R curve passes through point C, a point above the L curve.) In this case,
QI < 0 for all I, so that no optimum with I > 0 exists.
An increase in s ≡ τ/m shifts the L curve outwards, so that ∂I0/∂s > 0. An
increase in b or q moves the R curve outwards (because ϕ < 1), so that ∂I0/∂b < 0
and ∂I0/∂q < 0. For the impact of b and q on z0, we again have sign[∂z0/∂b] =
−sign[∂I0/∂b] and sign[∂z0/∂q] = −sign[∂I0/∂q] from restriction z + I = τ/m.25
And (A8) with 1 − ρ(1 − ϕ) < 0 implies sign[∂z0/∂s] = −sign[∂I0/∂s]. For
1 = ρ(1 − ϕ), ∂z0/∂s = 0. QED.
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